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STATE DEFERRAL OF COMPLAINTS UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
I. Introduction
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act' (ADEA) was enacted "to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age"
and "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment."2 ADEA provides
federal relief for victims of age discrimination, while preserving similar state
laws.'
Difficulties have arisen, however, in defining the federal-state relationship
under the Act and in determining the circumstances under which federal juris-
diction may be asserted over a complaint. Specifically unsettled is whether com-
plainants in those states that have age discrimination laws are required to pursue
state remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a complaint under
ADEA. The few courts which have considered the issue have determined that
if an ADEA plaintiff has not previously filed his complaint with the appropriate
state agency, federal courts should refuse to assert jurisdiction over the matter.4
This construction of the statute, however, may well be iln-founded. The
basis underlying this interpretation is an analogy between § 633 of ADEA and
§ 2000e-5(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' Section 2000e-5(c)
requires a plaintiff to initially take his complaint to state authorities, if an appro-
priate state authority exists, prior to seeking a federal remedy under the statute.
Courts considering ADEA have construed § 633 to require the same state defer-
ral requirement, purportedly relying upon an interpretation of § 2000e-5 (c).
An examination of judicial constructions of § 2000e-5 (c), however, reveals that
reliance on these decisions to support mandatory state deferral under ADEA is
improper. In construing § 2000e-5 (c), the courts have established a rule allow-
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
3 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970).
4 There is no requirement that a complainant must exhaust state remedies before com-
mencing a federal suit. While state remedies must be pursued, they need not be exhausted.
Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 633 (1970) provides:
"(a) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State per-
forming like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age
except that upon commencement of action under this Act such action shall supersede any
State action.
(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a
State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be
brought under section 7 of this Act before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated..."
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970) provides in part:"(c) In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or
political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful em-
ployment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant
or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon
receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the
person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated."
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ing complainants who fail to seek state remedies before commencing a federal
action under the statute to. obtain relief either from state or federal authorities;
this is allowed in spite of their failure to adhere to the state deferral requirement
of Title VII. Additionally, Title VII courts have approved the implementation
of procedural regulations which ensure that a complainant who fails to initially
seek state remedies will not lose his rights under the federal statute.
Thus, the analogy between § 633 of ADEA and § 2000e-5(c) of Title VII
has not been closely followed by courts construing § 633; the results obtained
under the two statutes are clearly inconsistent. In addition, since a large number
of ADEA actions are brought pro se, the strict state deferral requirement may
create a procedural pitfall for many complainants, which of course would thwart
the achievement of ADEA's purposes.
II. The Validity of the Analogy Between § 633 and § 2000e-5 (c)
The propriety of analogizing from § 633 to § 2000e-5 (c) as a basis for
interpretation of § 633 is the subject of dispute. An analysis of the arguments
both in support of and in opposition to the validity of the analogy aids in deter-
mining whether the analogy should continue.
A. § 633 of ADEA is a Counterpart of § 2000e-5(c) of Title VII
One basis of comparison between § 633 and § 2000e-5 (c) is the provisions'
similar language. This similarity led the Third Circuit, in Goger v. H. K. Porter
Co.,6 to establish the analogy as the basis for construction of § 633. Indeed, an
examination of the language of the two provisions reveals that it is virtually
identical,' and therefore the Goger court decided that interpretations of § 633
must conform to constructions of § 200Oe-5 (c). Since courts have construed
§ 2000e-5 (c) to require that appropriate state agencies be given an opportunity
to consider discrimination complaints before a complainant may resort to federal
authorities, the Third Circuit established a similar mandatory state deferral re-
quirement under ADEA.
The legislative history of ADEA also indicates that the statute is closely
related to Title VII. By 1964, significant federal legislation to bar discrimination
in employment on the basis of race, religion, color, and sex had been enacted,
yet the problem of age discrimination was left untouched.' Under the provisions
of § 715 of Title VII, the Secretary of Labor was required to study the problem
of age discrimination in employment.' The Secretary's Report, submitted in
June 1965, indicated the full significance of the problem. Congress then re-
quired the Secretary to submit legislative proposals to implement the recom-
6 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
7 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1970), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970).
8 H.R. Rr.P. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
10 HousE CoMM. ON EDuc. & LABOR, THE OL.DR AMnRicAN WouER: AGE DiscmmiNA-
nON IN EMPLOYBENT, H.R. REP. No. 3708, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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mendations and conclusions contained in his report.1 ' The resultant proposed
ADEA was submitted to Congress in February 1967, and was enacted into law
in December of that year. ADEA is thus regarded as "remedial legislation,"'
since it extends the protection available under Title VII to those who suffer
age discrimination. Since ADEA essentially supplements the protection afforded
by Title VII, and since the language of § 633 is virtually identical to the lan-
guage of § 2000e-5(c), the ADEA provision should arguably be construed in
the same manner as the Title VII provision.
Additional support for parallel constructions of Title VII and ADEA is
found from the similar circumstances in which each of these statutes was en-
acted. Although fair employment legislation existed in 25 states prior to the
enactment of Title VII," pervasive inequality in employment continued.'4
Similarly, when ADEA was passed, 24 states had local legislation dealing with
age discrimination. 5 Studies of the effectiveness of these age discrimination laws,
however, were inconclusive." The continued existence of discrimination in em-
ployment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, despite state
statutes prohibiting such discrimination, suggested the need for federal legislation
to provide protection for persons in states which had no discrimination laws,
and to fill the gaps in existing state laws. Title VII was passed to meet this
need. When a similar need arose for federal legislation prohibiting age discrimi-
nation, ADEA was enacted. Thus, the remedial nature of ADEA and the similar
objectives of it and Title VII seemingly warrants an analogous approach to the
two statutes.
B. § 633 Is Not Analogous to § 2000e-5(c)
Several arguments may be advanced in opposition to an interpretation of
§ 633 based on an analogy drawn between § 633 and § 2000e-5(c). Struc-
turally, the jurisdictional requirements under Title VII are contained in §
2000e-5(c). Under ADEA, however, procedural prerequisites to federal juris-
diction are not contained in the analogue § 633 but instead in § 626(b). Sec-
tion 633 is directed primarily towards the federal-state relationship regarding
the handling of age discrimination complaints and only secondarily to procedural
requirements; § 2000e-5(c) is directed primarily towards the establishment of
procedural prerequisites to federal suit under Title VII" Thus, the purpose of
§ 633 is significantly different from that of § 2000e-5 (c). Since their respective
functions are distinguishable, however similar may be their language, it is im-
proper to draw an analogy between the two provisions.
Moreover, subsection (a) of § 633, which has no counterpart under Title
VII, specifically provides that ADEA shall not preempt similar state law. The
11 Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 601, 80 Stat. 844 (1966).
12 492 F.2d at 17.
13 2 U.S. CONG. & ADM. Naws 2515 (1964).
14 Id.
15 H.R. RP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
16 Id. Only one state positively indicated that there had been a decrease of age dis-
crimination in actual hiring.
17 492 F.2d at 17 (Garth, J., concurring).
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fact that ADEA contains § 633 (a) and that Title VII contains no similar pro-
vision reinforces the notion that § 633 should not be analogized to § 2000e-5 (c).
Section 633 (a) reveals that § 633 deals with the federal-state relationship; that
provision indicates the circumstances under which federal authority over an age
discrimination complaint may be asserted. It is not concerned with the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to federal suit, which are found in § 626(b) of the Act. The
limitations of § 633 operate only after the federal-state choice has been made in
favor of the state."' There is no requirement that an aggrieved party must always
proceed first with a state agency. 9
Section 633 (a) provides that state proceedings are superseded by the filing
of a federal action. This provision, which dictates that commencement of a
federal proceeding supersedes a state action, is not consistent with an intent
to require strict state deferral. A more plausible interpretation of congressional
intent is that the § 633 limitations on the right to bring a federal action become
effective only where the complainant has chosen to initiate proceedings with the
state agency."0
C. Inconsistencies in the Analogy of § 633 to § 2000e-5(c)
In spite of disagreement about the proper construction of § 633, the pro-
vision does establish concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in the area of age
discrimination.2 The legislative history reveals that Congress recognized the
value of new and different legislative approaches to the problem of age discrimi-
nation by preserving state jurisdiction in the area.22 The preservation of state
power to prohibit age discrimination in employment also allows states to go be-
yond the federal minimum requirements.23
However, the effect of § 633 is unclear. As construed in Goger, § 633
requires the complainant to pursue available state remedies prior to filing a
federal suit. 4 Whether this interpretation is justified is uncertain. The primary
obstacle to a conclusive interpretation of the provision is the lack of clear con-
gressional intent both in the language of the statute and in its legislative history.
The Goger court characterized the legislative history of ADEA as "devoid of
any intention of Congress to deviate from the basic philosophy of the 1964 Act
Title VII of initially giving state agencies sixty days to resolve the problem."25
But the amicus brief filed on behalf of the Secretary of Labor in Goger indicates
that the legislative history is "devoid of any indication that Congress intended
to restrict an individual's right to file suit under the Act to cases in which pro-
18 Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. RFv. 227, 234 (1974).
19 Id.
20 492 F.2d at 18.
21 Hearings on S. 830 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1967).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 48.
24 See text accompanying note 30 infra.
25 492 F.2d at 16.
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ceedings have first commenced under State law."2 It is evident, then, that
constructions of § 633, whatever they may be, are necessarily unsatisfactory due
to an absence of discernible congressional intent.
While there is a lack of clarity in the statute and the legislative history, an
analysis of the problems which arise as a result of the Goger interpretation of
the statute is possible. Section 633 cases following Goger are inconsistent with
cases construing § 2000e-5(c)."7 If the analogy made by the Third Circuit is
improper, and § 633 can be construed without resort to the provisions of §
2000e-5 (c), then these problems will dissipate as courts reverse decisions denying
federal remedies to complainants under § 633. But even if the analogy is valid,
then at a minimum it should be followed logically so as to produce an even-
handed application of the state deferral requirement to individuals with discrimi-
nation complaints; presently, however, such an evenhandedness is clearly lacking.
III. The Improper Basis for the Goger Court's Construction of § 633
The Third Circuit held in Goger v. H. K. Porter Co.2" that § 633 of ADEA
and § 2000e-5(c) of Title VII are analogous provisions. Noting that the lan-
guage of the two provisions is "virtually identical,"29 the court concluded that
§ 633, like § 2000e-5 (c), must be interpreted to require that "appropriate state
agencies be given a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints be-
fore resorting to federal courts."" As authority for this interpretation of §
2000e-5 (c), the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Love v. Pullman."'
A close reading of Love, however, reveals that the reliance of the Goger court
upon Love is ill-founded, 2 and some doubt is cast, therefore, upon the accuracy
of the analogy which served as the basis of the Goger court's decision.
The central issue before the court in Goger was whether an aggrieved indi-
vidual under ADEA is required to seek redress from a state agency before going
into federal court. Goger alleged that her employment with H. K. Porter Co.
had been terminated because of her age. The district court dismissed Goger's
complaint, holding that it did not have jurisdiction since Goger had not pre-
viously filed her complaint with the appropriate state agency."3 The Third
Circuit, finding that the "minor differences" between § 633 and § 2000e-5 (c)
were "insignificant," affirmed the district court's decision, holding that there
was "no support for an interpretation of . . . [§ 633] which is contrary to
26 Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 12, Goger v. H. K. Porter Co.,
492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
27 These inconsistencies are discussed in Part IV infra.
28 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
29 Id. at 15.
30 Id. at 15-16.
31 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
32 The Third Circuit in Goger also cited Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422
F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971), and Electrical
Workers Local 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1968).
Crosslin is discussed in the text accompanying notes 48-52 infra. The issue in Electrical
Workers was whether a letter sent by a complainant to the EEOC, before state proceedings on
his complaint had been terminated, could qualify as a valid charge under the statute. The
Third Circuit held that such a letter did qualify as an effective charge.
33 5 E.P.D. 11 8562 (D.N.J. 1973).
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the Supreme Court's construction [of § 2000e-5(c)] in Love v. Pullman.""4
The court nevertheless granted Goger equitable relief, since her failure to first
pursue state remedies was due to her reliance upon the advice of a, compliance
officer of the Labor Department.35 However, the court stated unequivocally
that ADEA requires a complainant to seek relief from appropriate state agencies
prior to instituting suit in federal court, adding that this requirement "should
be strictly followed and enforced" in the future. 6
While Goger considered the construction of § 633, Love confronted the
validity of regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) "7 to comply with the state deferral requirement of Title
VII. Love had filed complaints alleging age discrimination with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission in 1963 and 1965. Dissatisfied with the Commission's
determination, Love contacted the EEOC in 1966 concerning his complaint.
To ensure compliance with the the state deferral requirement contained in §
2000e-5 (c) of Title VII, the EEOC deferred the matter to the Colorado Com-
mission, pursuant to procedural regulations set up by the EEOC in 1965. "
The Colorado Commission waived its right to take further action, and the EEOC
proceeded with its own investigation, finding probable cause to support the
charge of discrimination. When Pullman, his employer, failed to comply with
measures recommended by the EEOC to end the alleged discrimination, Love
filed suit in federal district court.
Due to the complexity of Title VII's procedural requirements, a state
deferral procedure had been established by the EEOC to avoid the accidental
forfeiture of a complainant's rights under the statute."9 The EEOC had found
that many actions filed under Title VII were pro se complaints, and that these
complainants were frequently deprived of their rights under the statute due to
their lack of awareness of the statute's state deferral requirement." Under these
procedures, the EEOC deferred complaints to the appropriate state agency,
holding the federal action in "suspended animation"41 pending the termination
of the state proceeding. If the state agency failed to take action within 60 days,
or did not terminate its proceedings within this period, the EEOC took action
on the matter. A refiling of the complaint by the aggrieved party after the
termination of state proceedings was not required.
The Tenth Circuit held, however, that this procedure was neither contem-
plated nor permitted by the statute."' Concluding that the filing requirements
of Title VII mandated that Love refile his complaint with the EEOC after the
34 492 F.2d at 16.
35 Additionally, equitable relief was considered to be appropriate since no court had yet
construed the provision in question; Goger was barred from seeking state remedies since the
applicable statute of, limitations period had elapsed.
36 492 F.2d at 17.
37 The EEOC is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970) to handle discrimination
complaints arising under the statute.
38 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (1965).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 404 U.S. at 526.
42 430 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 1969).
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state proceedings had terminated, the court held the EEOC deferral procedure
to be invalid.
The Supreme Court reversed,43 holding that the procedure followed by the
EEOC fully complied with the purpose of the statute. The Court found no sug-
gestion in the language of the legislation that state proceedings could not be
commenced by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by
the complainant himself. Therefore, the Court concluded, the EEOC had prop-
erly exercised its authority in establishing procedural regulations which effec-
tively held a complaint in "suspended animation" while the matter was deferred
to the state authority.44 The Court decided that requiring a second filing of the
complaint by the aggrieved party was an unwarranted procedural technicality.
The issue of mandatory state deferral presented in Goger was thus only
tangentially related to the issue that confronted the Court in Love,45 which was
the validity of the EEOC's state deferral procedure. Moreover, the effects of
these two decisions are inconsistent. The effect of Goger is that a complainant
under ADEA may be denied a federal remedy because of his failure to initially
pursue his claim at the state level. This is precisely the effect which the EEOC
sought to avoid in the state deferral procedure instituted under Title VII and
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Love.46 Goger, by establishing a mandatory
state deferral requirement, creates a procedural technicality which may result
in the loss of a complainant's federal remedy. Love approves procedures which
obviate the possible loss of a federal remedy. In relying upon an incidental aspect
of Love, the Third Circuit in Goger disregarded the essential thrust of Love.
The ADEA complainant will not have the same protection against the
inadvertent forfeiture of his federal rights as does his counterpart under Title
VII unless the same procedural safeguard that exists under Title VII is instituted
under ADEA. The need for such protection has been demonstrated under Title
VII; the EEOC found that complainants under Title VII often accidentally
lost their federal rights before the institution of this safeguard." The supple-
mentation of ADEA with similar procedures would correct the present incon-
sistencies in the § 633-§ 2000e-5 (c) analogy. If the Goger analysis requiring
mandatory state deferral is correct, then the Love sanction of those Title VII
procedures should be equally applicable to procedures established under ADEA.
IV. The Case Law: Disparate Judicial Constructions of
§ 633 and § 2000e-5(c)
Court decisions construing the state deferral requirement of ADEA have
43 Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
44 Id. at 526.
45 In Love, the only direct reference to the issue confronted by the Goger court is found
in the opening sentence of the decision:
A person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, may not maintain a suit for redress in federal district
court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential admin-
istrative relief.
404 U.S. at 523.




differed significantly from those interpreting the same requirements of Title VII,
with important differences in results. Title VII courts have emphasized the
importance of providing the complainant with a remedy, and have granted
relief in spite of procedural irregularities in the state deferral process. This
flexibility in dealing with the state deferral requirement is totally lacking in
court decisions under ADEA. As a result, though the Goger court's construction
of § 633 was based upon an analogy between § 2000e-5 (c) and § 633, ADEA's
state deferral requirement differs substantially in effect from that of Title VII.
Crosslin v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., " relied upon
by the Third Circuit in Goger as authority for its state deferral rule, provides
an example of court interpretations of Title VII's state deferral requirement.
Erlene Crosslin filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC
alleging that the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company had
refused to hire her solely because she was black. Although Arizona law pro-
hibited the alleged discrimination and established a state Civil Rights Commis-
sion to deal with violations of the law, Crosslin did not file her complaint with
the state agency, but initiated her action instead with the EEOC."9 After an
EEOC investigation had established reasonable cause to believe that a violation
had occurred, a suit was filed in federal court. The defendant moved to dismiss
Crosslin's suit on the ground that Crosslin had not pursued her state remedies
prior to filing suit in federal court, as required by § 2000e-5 (c). The Ninth Cir-
cuit, reversing the lower court, sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss."0
Since there was a state agency authorized to seek relief, the court held that the
EEOC was without authority to process Crosslin's complaint until the state
agency had had 60 days to settle the dispute. However, the period of filing com-
plaints under the Arizona law had already expired, and consequently Crosslin
was left without a remedy.
The Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, vacated and remanded the case
to the district court with instructions to follow the suggestions in the amicus brief
filed by the Solicitor General."' The Solicitor's brief had suggested that when
a complainant fails to comply with the state deferral requirement of the statute
before instituting a federal action, the district court should be permitted to retain
48 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded, 400 U.S. 1004 (1971).
49 The EEOC did not believe that the Arizona Commission was an agency authorized to"grant or seek relief" within the meaning of Title VII, and advised Crosslin that she need
not file her complaint with the state commission. The only remedy or sanction provided by
Arizona law for unlawful discrimination was a criminal penalty which would not exceed
$300.00. While Title VII provides federal courts with power to grant various forms of personal
relief to the aggrieved person, Arizona law provided no such remedies. The EEOC believed
that the state agency must be authorized to grant suitable relief to the aggrieved person before
the state deferral requirement would become operative.
The issue, therefore, was the scope of the relief intended by Title VII. The Ninth Circuit
decided that the relief intended by the statute is not that which the courts may grant in
response to a petition by an aggrieved person; it is rather the relief which may be sought
by the state or local authority itself. The Arizona Commission sought to eliminate unlawful
discrimination practices through conciliation conference, and persuasion. The court decided
that this was the relief intended by Title VII, and thus reasoned that the Arizona Commis-
sion was an agency authorized to grant or seek relief within the meaning of Title VII.
Crosslin's failure to seek relief from the Arizona Commission operated as a jurisdictional bar
to her federal suit. 422 F.2d at 1032.
50 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970).
51 400 U.S. 1004 (1971).
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jurisdiction over the matter for a period sufficient to allow the complainant or
the EEOC to seek redress under the procedures authorized by state law. If the
state authority elects not to act on the complaint, the district court should then
consider the case.52 Following this decision, both the Sixth and Ninth5 4 Cir-
cuits have reversed lower court orders dismissing Title VII actions because the
complainant or the EEOC had failed to initially file complaints with the appro-
priate state agency.
Thus, a mitigating practice has emerged under Title VII whereby a com-
plainant is allowed a second opportunity to seek redress, and is allowed this
second chance in spite of the running of the statute of limitations. The Crosslin
decision clearly indicates the importance which the Supreme Court attaches to
the full consideration of a complainant's rights under Title VII. In a variety of
situations involving defects in compliance with the procedural regulations of
Title VII, courts have been "extremely reluctant to allow procedural technicali-
ties to bar claims brought under the Act."55 It is recognized that since Title VII
is an "intricate statute hedged about with definitional, substantive, and proce-
dural limitations, restrictions, and requirements . . . [its] provisions are not to
be interpreted too literally or too technically."56 In the Love decision, the Su-
preme Court, approving regulations intended to minimize complications in the
filing of complaints, regarded procedural technicalities as "inappropriate" in the
statutory scheme of Title VII.57
These decisions construing the procedural requirements of Title VII, how-
ever, have not been followed by courts dealing with analogous situations under
ADEA. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, in
McGarvey v. Merck & Co.,5" considered McGarvey's allegation that his employer
had dismissed him after 21 years of service because of his age (he was 59).
Although the decision was later vacated and remanded by the Third Circuit,5"
the district court, citing Goger, dismissed the complaint because McGarvey had
failed to initially seek relief from the state agency.
Outside the Third Circuit, the only court to follow Goger has been the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in Vaughn v.
Chrysler Corp.6" The difference between the results obtained under Title VII
and those obtained under ADEA is aptly demonstrated by a comparison of
Vaughn and EEOC v. Mah Chang Albany Corp.61 In dismissing the ADEA
52 Brief for the Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae, Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004 (1971), quoted in Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d
24, 26 (6th Cir. 1972).
53 Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
928 (1972).
54 EEOC v. Mah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1974); Oubichon v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Parker v. General Tel. Co., 476 F.2d 595
(9th Cir. 1973); Motorola, Inc. v. EEOC, 460 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1972).
55 Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1970).
56 EEOC v. Mah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1974).
57 404 U.S. at 527.
58 356 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated and remanded, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
59 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974).
60 382 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
61 499 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1974).
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action in Vaughn, the district court decided that the complainant's failure to
make timely resort of state remedies was a "fatal jurisdictional defect."'62 The
Ninth Circuit, in Mah Chang, noted that Title VII decisions "necessarily imply
that deferral is not a jurisdictional fact in the sense that its absence deprives the
court of power to act."
68
ADEA courts, then, while purporting to accept the § 633-§ 2000e-5(c)
analogy, do not correspondingly adhere to the further substantive constructions
of § 2000e-5 (c) cases. Courts, being reluctant to allow procedural technicalities
to bar claims brought under Title VII, have been generally flexible in dealing
with the procedural regulations of the statute. On the other hand, courts dealing
with ADEA have been rigid and inflexible regarding such procedural matters.
If § 633 is to be deemed analogous to § 2000e-5 (c), the case law developed
under § 2000e-5(c) should control similar situations arising under § 633. Cur-
rently, the analogy has not been fully followed, resulting in the irony that com-
plainants under Title VII are permitted to seek federal relief in spite of proce-
dural irregularities in the state deferral process, while complainants under ADEA
are not.
If ADEA is supplemented with a procedural safeguard analogous to that
which exists under Title VII, and the case law developed under § 2000e-5 (c) is
applied to similar situations arising under § 633, the analogy made between
§ 2000e-5(c) and § 633 would be followed to its logical and proper con-
clusion.
While valid considerations lie behind the requirement of initial deference
to state remedies, the significant numbers of pro se complaints dictate that
procedural complexities, with their resultant forfeitures, be minimized. Under
Title VII, the state deferral regulations set up by the EEOC accommodate this
concern. If the laudable goal of eliminating age discrimination in employment
in this country is to be realized, ADEA must be supplemented with similar
procedures. In addition, the flexibility exhibited by courts in dealing with the
state deferral requirement of Title VII must be adopted by courts construing
this same requirement under ADEA, and the Title VII case law should be ap-
plied to similar situations arising under ADEA. Unless these steps are taken,
the achievement of the purposes of ADEA will be thwarted.
V. The Role of ADEA's State Deferral Requirement
An examination of the purposes of the ADEA state deferral requirement
indicates that the suggestions made here-that the case law under § 2000e-5 (c)
should be applied to similar situations under § 633, and that procedures similar
to those protecting complainants under § 2000e-5 (c) should be instituted to
protect § 633 complainants--do not undercut the objectives of § 633. An
understanding of the important role the state deferral requirement was intended
to play in the statutory framework of ADEA may be derived from a comparison
62 382 F. Supp. at 146.
63 499 F.2d at 189.
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of § 633 and § 2000e-5 (c). However, the importance of a state deferral require-
ment must be balanced with the necessity of achieving effective enforcement of
the Act. Since many complaints under ADEA are pro se actions, the absence of
procedural regulations to safeguard complainants' rights similar to those that
exist under § 2000e-5 (c) hinders the achievement of full enforcement of the Act
and finally only thwarts the accomplishment of Congress' purpose in enacting the
statute.
A. The Role of State Deferral Procedures
in Balancing Federal and State Power
At the time of Title VII's enactment, Congress confronted resistance to
growing federal power and authority in areas in which the states had previously
exercised sole authority."4 Some opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(wherein Title VII is contained) expressed fears that the Act was another step
in the extension of federal power to the point that the "vitality, autonomy, and
even the viability of State and local governments . . . [were] seriously
threatened."65
The state deferral requirements included under Title VII represent a
compromise between the need for a federal program to end discrimination and
fears of federal infringement upon state power. Congress sought to leave
"primary, exclusive jurisdiction" over enforcement of discrimination laws in the
hands of state agencies "for a sufficient period of time to let them work out their
own problems at the local level." 6
State deferral requirements under Title VII, then, seem to be an effective
means of balancing important political interests rather than a mere procedural
technicality. If the analogy between § 633 and § 2000e-5 (c) is valid, then the
same considerations apply with like force under ADEA.
B. Pro Se Complaints Necessitate Minimal Procedural Technicalities
The purpose of state deferral regulations must be considered together with
the need for effective enforcement of both Title VII and ADEA. The typical
complaint under both statutes is initiated by a layman without the aid of an
attorney.67 In interpreting Title VII, courts generally have been aware that the
layman's crucial role in the statutory scheme68 is important to achieving effective
enforcement of the statute. 9 For example, in Love the Supreme Court con-
sidered procedural technicalities to be inappropriate under Title VII because
64 See 2 U.S. CONG. & Anm. NEws 2413-19 (1964).
65 Id. at 2419.
66 110 CONG. REc. 13087 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). See id. at 12707 (re-
marks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 13081 (remarks of Senator Clark); id. at 13088 (remarks
of Senator Humphrey).
67 404 U.S. at 527. See also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Willis v. Chicago
Extruded Metals Co., 358 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
68 See 431 F.2d at 461.
69 511 F.2d at 202; 431 F.2d at 461.
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the legislation contemplates "a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers, initiate the process."7 The EEOC, which has been delegated
the responsibility of enforcing Title VII, has also indicated its awareness of the
layman's vital role in the statutory scheme. In setting up procedural regula-
tions to effect the state deferral requirement, the EEOC recognized the im-
portance of simplified filing procedures. 1 This simplification of filing procedures
enhances the ability of people who do not have legal training to secure their
rights under the statute, and thereby helps achieve the full potential of the lay-
man's role in securing the statute's enforcement.
The significance played by the pro se complainant in furthering effective
enforcement of ADEA has also been recognized." Employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations are required to post notices to their employees,
applicants for emeployment, and union members pertaining to the rights and
protections afforded by ADEA. These notices must be posted in prominent
and accessible places where they may be readily observed. 3 People who may be
protected by ADEA must be given the opportunity to learn of their rights under
the statute.74 It is hoped that by these measures the pro se complainant, in
securing his own rights under the statute, will assume an active role in the en-
forcement of ADEA.
The need for encouraging the participation of the layman in enforcing ADEA
is particularly acute. ADEA violations, often subtle, are difficult to uncover and
document.75 Although ADEA became law in 1967, five years later age dis-
crimination in employment was not only still prevalent, but was actually increas-
ing. 6 In 1974, substantial age discrimination violations were still being dis-
closed;77 these discovered violations of ADEA are estimated to represent only
a minor portion of the actual number of violations covered by the law.7
Although greater public awareness of ADEA has resulted in a consistent increase
in the number of complaints filed under the Act during the past few years, 9
these great increases in the number of complaints and investigations which
reveal age discrimination practices demonstrate the continuing pervasiveness of
age discrimination in employment. They also point to the need for efficacious
means of eliminating such discriminatory practices. The layman's vital role in
70 404 U.S. at 527.
71 The complexity of these filing procedures had often caused the accidental forfeiture of
the federal rights of people who sought aid from the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (a) (1965).
72 See 29 C.F.R. § 850.10 (1973).
73 Id.
74 An analysis of a survey conducted by the Manpower Administration of the Depart-
ment of Labor in May-June 1963, concluded that the volume of age discrimination complaints
is related to public awareness of the law as a result of promotional activity, rather than to
the effect of discrimination. 2 U.S. CONG. & ADM. NEws 2215 (1967).
75 1975 SEC. OF LABOR ANN. REP. 12.
76 SPECILL COMM. ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, DEVELOPMENTS ON AGING: 1971 AND
JANUARY-MARcH 1972, S. REP. No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. XXII, at 50 n.3 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS ON AGING].
77 1975 SEC. OF LABOR ANN. REP. 7. During the fiscal year 1974, 7,983 investigative
actions by the Department of Labor resulted in a finding of $6,315,484 in damages owed to
complainants under ADEA. New job opportunities, made available by the removal of dis-
criminatory age barriers, totalled 84,207 in the same year.
78 DEVELOPMENTS ON AGING, supra note 76, at XXII 50.
79 1975 SEC. LABOR ANN. REP. 8.
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enforcing ADEA must be encouraged, since without his participation in enforc-
ing the statute there is little likelihood of ending age discrimination in employ-
ment. The supplementation of ADEA with procedures to accommodate the strict
state deferral requirement would serve as a means of encouraging the layman's
role; this opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the statute should be fully
utilized.
VI. Conclusion
The issue of whether the analogy made between § 633 of ADEA and §
2000e-5 (c) of Title VII is valid will remain the subject of dispute, due to the
lack of clear congressional intent regarding § 633. However, problems and in-
consistencies resulting from the analogy must be examined and corrected. While
courts purport to follow this analogy in construing § 633, they do not actually
do so. As a result, the complainant under ADEA is required to adhere to a strict
state deferral rule, while the complainant under Title VII is not.
Moreover, procedures exist under Title VII whereby a complainant who files
a complaint with the EEOC need never be concerned with the state deferral
requirement. Because ADEA is not supplemented with similar procedures, the
results reached under the two "analogous" statutes are inconsistent. Title VII's
procedural safeguard, and the case law principle developed under the statute
which allows the complainant a second opportunity to seek redress for his
grievance, combine to afford the complainant significantly more aid and protec-
tion in securing his rights under Title VII than is available to a complainant
under ADEA.
The supplementation of ADEA with procedures for state deferral similar to
those existing under Title VII would serve the purposes for which this deferral
requirement was included in the statute and would enhance the enforcement of
the Act. Since age discrimination in employment remains a pervasive reality in
the United States, such a step to achieve greater effectiveness of ADEA is
acutely needed.
Robert J. Cramer
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